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Sedler: Interstate Accidents and the Unprovided For Case: Reflections on

INTERSTATE ACCIDENTS AND THE
UNPROVIDED FOR CASE: REFLECTIONS ON
NEUMEIER v. KUEHINER
Robert Allen Sedler*
THE
primary focus of interest analysis, as developed by Brainerd
Currie,1 was on identifying false and true conflicts. 2 Currie also
recognized, however, that there could be a case in which none of
the involved states had an interest in applying its law on the issue
as to which their laws differed. This he called the unprovided for
case, which, while "comparatively rare,"4 did occur, and in Gurrie's
view, should be resolved with reference to other policies that were
common to the involved states.5 Currie did not fully develop the
rationale for resolving the unprovided for case until he came to
consider the effect of the privileges and immunities6 and the equal
protection7 clauses upon a court's freedom to choose the applicable
law. His concern there in the context of the unprovided for case was
whether the forum, in order to avoid unreasonable discrimination,
was required to apply its own law in favor of a non-resident party.8
But it must be admitted that Currie did not fully develop the rationale for resolving the unprovided for case.9
Currie also intimated that it was the unprovided for case which
might present the most difficulty for the utilization of interest analysis, since by definition "neither state cares what happens,"1 0 and
the basis of interest analysis is the identification of the interests of the
involved states. His fears, I would submit, are well borne out by
the decision of the New York Court of Appeals in Neumier v.
* A.B., J.D, University of Pittsburgh. Professor of Law, University of Kentucky.
1. B. CtURE, SEaLEcrED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICr OF LAws (1968).

2. Id. Professor Currie's solutions are best summarized in Ch. 4.

3. Id. at 152-53.
4. Id. at 189 n.3.
5. See particularly the discussion id. at 153-56.
6. U.S. CorsT. art. IV, § 2.
7. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV.
8. The question, as he saw it, was whether the Constitution required the forum to
be "altruistic" in order to avoid discrimination against non-resident parties.
9. Professor Weintraub, another proponent of interest analysis, has in my view,
also failed to deal adequately with the unprovided for case in his treatise. R. WEINrTAU,
COMMENTARY ON THE CoNFLIcr OF LAws (1971). See the discussion in Sedler, Book Review, The Last Treatise, 50 TExAs L. REv. 1064, 1072 (1972); Conflict of Laws Roundtable: A Symposium, 57 IowA. L. REv. 1229, 1232 (1972). For Professor Weintraub's
reply, see Weintraub, Conflict of Laws Roundtable: A Symposium, id. at 1258-61.
10. B. CURRIE, supra note 1, at 152.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1973

1

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1973], Art. 10

Hofstra Law Review
Kuehner.1" Not only did the court decide the case in a way of which
Currie would not approve, but it limited the application of interest
analysis, which by that time-despite a rocky path-seemed fairly
secure in New York. 12 Neumeier was clearly the unprovided for case.
The decedent was a resident of Ontario, a guest statute state,'3 and
the accident occurred there. The defendant was a resident of New
York, and his automobile was insured there. 14 Ontario had no
interest in immunizing the New York host and his insured,"; and
New York had no interest in applying its law to allow recovery to a
non-resident injured in his home state.' 6
Previous interstate accident cases coming before the New York
Court of Appeals had involved either false or true conflicts. With
the decision in Tooker v. Lopez,17 despite the fact that the court
was "wracked by dissent,"':8 it was established that in a guest statute
case involving New York residents a false conflict was presented and
New York law would apply.19 In Miller v. Miller,20 the court was
faced with a conflict between Maine law imposing a limitation on
wrongful death recovery and its own law which allowed unlimited
recovery. The decedent was a New York resident and the defendant
was a Maine resident at the time of the accident, although he subsequently moved to New York. The accident occurred in Maine.
11. 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
12. The court had not only employed interest analysis in interstate accident cases

such as Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 101 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969), and
Millerv. Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968), but in other areas
of law as well. See, e.g., Intercontinental Planning Limited v. Daystrom, 24 N.Y.2d
372, 248 N.E.2d 576, 300 N.Y.S.2d 817 (1969) (contracts); In re Estate of Crichton, 20
N.Y.2d 124, 228 N.E.2d 799, 281 N.Y.S.2d 811 (1967) (property).
13. Highway Traffic Act of Province of Ontario [ONT. REy. STAT. ch. 172 (1960)],
§ 105(2), as amended, Stat. of 1966, ch. 64, § 20(2). The statute provides that the guest
passenger cannot recover unless the host was guilty of gross negligence.
14. Insurance rates are determined by the loss experience in a territory of insureds,
and the place where the vehicle is garaged is the place where it is considered insured
for loss allocation purposes. See the discussion in Morris, Enterprise Liability and the
ActuarialProcess-the Insignificance of Foresight,70 YALE L.J. 554, 567-9 (1961).
15. It had no interest in protecting the New York insurer and no tort policy of
Ontario would be advanced by enabling the nominal defendant to avoid liability. See
the discussion of tort and "anti-tort" policies in Sedler, Characterization,Identification
of the Problem Area, and the Policy-Centered Conflict of Laws: An Exercise in Judicial Method, 2 Rtrr.-CAm. L.J. 8, 49.56 (1970).
16. As to the possible interest in allowing recovery if the non-resident had been
injured in New York, see the discussion infra notes 60-69 and accompanying text.
17. 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969).
18. Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, 57 CORNEL L. Ra. 815, 818 (1972).
Judge Keating wrote the majority opinion in Tooker, in which Chief Judge Fuld and
Judges Burke and Bergan concurred. Chief Judge Fuld wrote a separate opinion in
which Judge Burke concurred. Judges Breitel, Scileppi, and Jasen dissented.
19. See the discussion in 24 N.Y.2d at 575-78, 249 N.E.2d at 898-99, 801 N.Y.S.2d
at 524-26.
20. 22 N.Y.2d 12, 287 N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968).
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In terms of interest analysis this was a true conflict, and New York
applied its own law on the ground that it had an interest in so doing
and that the application of its law was not unfair to the defendant or
his insurer.21 The court also emphasized the fact that the defendant
had subsequently changed his residence to New York, and the decision has been explained on that basis. 22 Taking Miller and Tooker
together, and looking to the approach taken in other cases, it clearly
seemed that the majority of the court at least was committed to the
methodology of interest analysis in dealing with conflicts problems.
Neumeier, however, involved the unprovided for case, and this
was the rock on which interest analysis foundered in New York.
With only Judge Bergan dissenting,2 3 the court questioned the utility
of interest analysis and turned instead to "narrow choice of law
rules." Chief Judge Fuld, speaking for the court, stated as follows: 24
In consequence of the change effected [looking to the law of
the state which has the "greatest interest" 25 in the specific
issue raised in the litigation]-our decision in multi-state
highway accident cases, particularly in those involving guesthost controversies, have, it must be acknowledged, lacked
consistency. This stemmed, in part, from the circumstance
that it is frequently difficult to discover the purposes or
policies underlying the relevant local law rules of the respective jurisdictions involved. It is even more difficult, assuming
that these purposes or policies are found to conflict, to deter21. The court pointed out that under Maine law the defendant would have
been fully liable for compensatory damages if the decedent had lived, and that Maine
automobile insurance policies did not distinguish between liability for personal injuries and liability for wrongful death, so that there was no "reliance" on the Maine
limitation. 22 N.Y.2d at 20, 237 N.E.2d at 881, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 740. Also under Maine
law the insurance policy could not be limited to accidents occurring in Maine. Id. at
21, 237 N.EW2d at 882, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 741. Thus, unlimited liability was "foreseeable
and insurable," and there was no unfairness in holding the insurer to the higher
standard of liability. The nominal defendant obviously wanted his brother's beneficiaries
to have full recovery against his insurance company. The court in Miller lined up the
same way it did subsequently in Tooker.
22. See the discussion in R. WEINmAuB, COMMENTARY, supra note 9, at 252-53.
23. The majority opinion was concurred in by Judges Burke, Scileppi and Gibson.
Judges Breitel and Jasen concurred on the ground that the law of the state of injury
should normally apply and that the accident did not have a sufficient relationship to
New York to justify a departure from the "normal rule."
24. 31 N.Y.2d at 127, 286 N.E.2d at 457, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 69.
25. The term "greatest interest" may cause some confusion, since, according to
Curie, a court cannot "weigh" conflicting interests. In practice, however, at least by
the time of Tooker, the "greatest interest" test meant that New York law would apply
whenever New York had a real interest in the application of its law and this produced
no unfairness to the other party.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1973

3

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1973], Art. 10

Hofstra Law Review
mine on some principled basis which should be given effect
at the expense of the others.
The single all-encompassing rule which called, invariably,
for selection of the law of the place of injury was discarded,
and wisely, because it was too broad to prove satisfactory in
application. There is, however, no reason why choice-of-law
rules, more narrow than those previously devised, should not
be successfully developed, in order to assure a greater degree
of predictability and uniformity, on the basis of our present
knowledge and experience.
Judge Fuld then referred to his concurring opinion in Tooker, in
which he set forth three principles for deciding guest statute cases,
and these principles were adopted by the majority in Neumeier.
First, when the passenger and driver were from the same state, that
state's law should apply on the issue of guest-host immunity. Second,
when the driver was from a guest statute state and the passenger was
from a recovery state, the law of the state where the accident occurred should apply.26 Third, where the parties were from different
states, the law of the state where the accident occurred should apply
unless it could be shown that "displacing that normally applicable
rule will advance the relevant substantive law purposes without impairing the smooth working of the multi-state system or producing
'27
great uncertainty for litigants.
Neumeier was governed by the third principle. The law of Ontario, where the accident occurred, was presumptively applicable.
The proviso to the third principle was not relevant here, in the view
28
of the court, because:
Certainly, ignoring Ontario's policy requiring proof of gross
negligence in a case which involves an Ontario-domiciled
guest at the expense of a New Yorker does not further the substantive law purposes of New York. In point of fact, application of New York law would result in the exposure of this
State's domiciiaries to a greater liability than that imposed
upon resident users of Ontario's highways. Conversely, the
failure to apply Ontario's law would "impair"--to cull from
the rule set out above-"the smooth working of the multi26. The court recognized that there might be "special circumstances" enabling a
driver from a guest statute state who caused the accident in a recovery state to assert
the law of his home state as a defense, but did not indicate what those "special circumstances" were. 31 N.Y.2d at 128, 286 N.E.2d at 457-58, 335 N.YS.2d at 70.
27. Id. at 128, 286 N.E.2d at 458, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 70.
28. Id. at 129, 286 N.E.2d at 458, 335 N.YS.2d at 70.
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state system [and] produce great uncertainty for litigants" by
sanctioning forum shopping and thereby allowing a party to
select a forum which could give him a larger recovery than the
court of his own domicile.
The court saw nothing discriminatory in refusing to give the same
protection to an Ontario plaintiff injured in Ontario by a New York
defendant that it would give to a New York plaintiff injured in the
same situation. 29 Where the injured plaintiff was an Ontario resident, New York, said the court, "has no legitimate interest in
ignoring the public policy of a foreign jurisdiction ... and in protecting the plaintiff guest domiciled and injured there from legislation obviously addressed, at the very least, to a resident riding in a
vehicle traveling within its borders."8 0 Although this meant that an
Ontario plaintiff injured in Ontario would not be protected against
a New York defendant while a New York plaintiff would, this was
said to be "the result of the existence of disparate rules of law in
jurisdictions that have diverse and important connections with the
litigants and the litigated issue."8 1 It was also immaterial that the
defendant's vehicle was insured in New York and that the insurance
policy covered the owner's liability regardless of where the accident
occurred, since "[t]he compulsory insurance requirement is designed to cover a car-owner's liability, not create it."82 And, as the
court concluded, quoting from Professor Reese,88 "[W]as the New
York rule really intended to be manna for the entire world?"8 4
My concern with the Neumeier decision is three-fold. As a proponent of what I have called judicial method and the policy-centered
conflict of laws, 3 5 I am particularly concerned about the approach
29. Under Tooker, of course, the New York plaintiff injured by a New York defen-

dant could recover irrespective of where the accident occurred or of the particular facts
giving rise to the accident.
30. 31 N.Y.2d at 125, 286 NE.2d at 456, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 68.
31. Id. at 126, 286 N.E2d at 456, 335 N.YS.2d at 68.
32. Id. In Tooker Judge Keating observed that the New York legislature "has
evinced commendable concern not only for residents of this State, but residents of other
States who may be injured as a result of the activities of New York residents." 24 N.Y.2d
at 577, 249 N.E.2d at 399, 301 N.YS.2d at 526. In Neumeier the court said that this

statement was "in the context, not of proving that New York had a governmental
interest in overriding foreign rules of liability, but of demonstrating that it was immaterial . .. that the driver and passenger, while domiciliaries of New York, were
attending college in Michigan." 31 N.Y.2d at 126, 286 N.E.2d at 456, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 68.
33. Reese, Chief Judge Fuld and Choice of Law, 71 CoLums. L. REv. 548, 563 (1971).
34. 31 N.Y.2d at 130, 286 NME2d at 458, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 71.
35. See generally Sedler, Characterization,Identification of the Problem Area, and
the Policy-Centered Conflict of Laws: An Exercise in Judicial Method, supra note 15;
Babcock v. Jackson in Kentucky: JudicialMethod and the Policy-Centered Conflict of

Laws, 56 Ky.L.J. 27 (1967). As to the application of this approach to contracts prob-
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to conflicts problems in terms of "narrow choice of law rules" that
the court adopted in Neumeier. Secondly, since interest analysis lies
at the core of my approach, 86 I want to develop precisely the rationale for solving the unprovided for case in terms of interest analysis.
Thirdly, I would like to explore further the question of discrimination in choice of law, including the constitutional overtones, and
consider whether in certain circumstances a state's rule of law must
be "manna for the entire world." The present writing will be structured along these lines.
JUDICIAL METHOD AND THE "NEUMEIER RULES"

In Neumeier the court tried to formulate choice of law rules37
for future application at least in guest statute cases.88 The rules that
the court formulated contained elements of both interest analysis
and considerations of territoriality, and perhaps are symbolic of the
court's ambivalence in this regard. After abandoning the place of
the wrong rule with its territorial basis, in Babcock v. Jackson,30 the
court-if it is possible to speak of "institutional behavior"-had
second thoughts in Dym v. Gordon.40 In Dym, it strained to find
a reason for applying the law of the place where the accident occurred,41 and did so on the ground that the relationship was "seated"
there. In Macey v. Rozbicki,42 it was able to reconcile its concern
with territorialism with its interest in applying New York law by
lems see the discussion in Sedler, The Contracts Provisions of the Restatement (Second):
An Analysis and a Critique,72 CoLum. L. REv. 279, 202-15 (1972).
36. I differ with Professor Currie only in regard to distinguishing between "real"

and "hypothetical" interests, and that difference will not frequently be significant. See
the discussion in Sedler, Conflict of Laws: Round Table Symposium, 49 TExAs L. REV.
224, 225 (1971). I agree with Professor Currie that in the case of a true conflict the
forum should apply its own law. Professor Weintraub, the leading present-day pro.
ponent of interest analysis, on the other hand, contends that there are rational bases
for resolving true conflicts. R. WEiNTRAuB, COMMENTARY, supra note 9, at 203-10. See
also the discussion in Sedler, Book Review, supra note 9, at 1075-78.
37. The court uses "rules" and "principles" interchangeably, and no distinction is
apparently intended.
58. It is difficult to see why they should be so limited if the court is really serious,
as I think it is, in trying to develop choice of law rules.
39. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
40. 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965).
41. It found that one of the purposes of the Colorado guest statute was to give
priority in the assets of the negligent driver to persons in the vehicle of the other driver,
so that Colorado had an interest in the application of its law notwithstanding that the
plaintiff and defendant were New York residents, 16 N.Y.2d at 124, 209 N.E.2d at 794,
262 N.Y.S.2d at 466. In Tooker, the court said that this could not have been a purpose
of the Colorado statute, since the statute permitted recovery by guests in the vehicle
of the negligent driver if they could establish that he was guilty of gross negligence.
24 N.Y.2d at 575, 249 N.E.2d at 397, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 524.
42. 18 N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d 380, 274 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1966).
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finding that the relationship between the parties, who were sisters,
was "seated" in New York. 43 When it could not perform this feat in
Tooker v. Lopez,44 which was indistinguishable on its facts from Dym,
it split, with the majority coming down in favor of interest analysis.45 As stated previously, the majority of the court had also been
employing interest analysis in other cases as well. 4 In Neumeier,
however-and only partly influenced by a change of personne4
-the court retreated considerably back to territorialism. It changed
its approach to one of "narrow choice of law rules," which were
based only in part upon interest analysis and in which considerations
of territoriality, i.e., the place where the accident occurred, predominated.
It has been my submission that the courts should decide conflicts
problems on a case by case basis with reference to considerations
of policy and fairness to the parties. Conflicts cases, particularly in
the tort area, fall into certain fact-law patterns, and in my view, can
properly be resolved with reference to those considerations. The
decision in each case will serve as a precedent for future ones, and
in time, based on the normal workings of stare decisis, a body of
conflicts law may emerge in each jurisdiction. I have called this
approach judicial method and the policy-centered conflict of laws
and have developed it more fully elsewhere.48 When the New York
Court of Appeals decided Tooker, it seemed to me that it was essentially following this kind of approach. It recognized that Babcock,
Dym, Macey, and Tooker, although they involved different factual
situations, presented the same fact-law pattern: two parties from a
recovery state were involved in an accident in an immunity state. 4 9
In terms of interest analysis this case was a false conflict, since New
York was interested in seeing that the New York plaintiff recover
for his personal injuries and the state of injury had no interest in
43. See the discussion of the Dym and Macey decisions in Sedler, Babcock v. Jackson
in Kentucky, supra note 35, at 77.
44. 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969).
45. See note 18 supra. The court said Dym could be distinguished because of the

presence of a third party "non-guest," but refused to rest its decision on that ground
and effectively overruled Dym, observing that: "[w]here the guest-host relationship
'arose' or is 'centered' is wholly irrelevant to policies reflected by the laws in conflict.
Any language in our earlier opinions lending support to a contrary view has ... been
overruled." 24 N.Y.2d at 579, 249 N.E.2d at 400, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 527.
46. See note 12 supra.
47. Judge Keating had been replaced by Judge Gibson. Of the other three members
of the "Tooker majority," only Judge Bergan dissented, and Judge Scileppi, who dissented in Tooker, concurred in the majority opinion in Neumeier.
48. Supra note 35.
49. See the discussion of fact-law patterns and their relationship to judicial method
in Sedler, Babcock v. Jackson in Kentucky, supra note 35, at 102-05.
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immunizing the New York defendant and his New York-based insurer50 from liability. In Miller v. Miller,5 1 decided a year before
2
Tooker, there was a different fact-law pattern: a recovery state
(unlimited liability for wrongful death) victim was involved in a
fatal accident with a defendant from a non-recovery state (limited
liability for wrongful death) in the defendant's home state. In this
case of true conflict the court, although split, applied New York
law on the basis of an "interest and fairness" test. 3 While the result
in Miller may have been influenced by the fact that the defendant
subsequently moved to New York,5 4 this was not crucial to the decision, and it is difficult to believe that the case would have been decided differently if the move had not occurred.5 5 Tooker then would
serve as a precedent for any interstate accident case presenting a false
conflict"8 and Miller for one presenting a true conflict.57
If the New York Court of Appeals was following the approach
of judicial method and the policy-centered conflict of laws prior to
Neumeier, it is clear after Neumeier that it has abandoned it. The
approach in Neumeer is one of choice of law rules, however narrow,
and more important, the rules that the court pronounced in Neumeier are not a summary of what the court had decided in previous
cases and do not necessarily follow from the decisions in those cases.5 8
50. See note 14 supra.
51. 22 N.Y.2d 12, 287 N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968).
52. I use the terms "recovery" and "non-recovery" to encompass the existence or
non-existence of affirmative tort liability, defenses such as guest statute immunity,
and limitations on the amount recoverable.
53. See note 21 supra.
54. See R. WEINTRAuB, CommTrrAaY, supra note 9.
55. The nominal defendant, who would have wanted his brother's beneficiaries to
recover against his insurer, would have permitted himself to be served in New York,
and in any event, quasi in rem jurisdiction would exist by the attachment of the
insurer's obligation to defend under the doctrine of Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111,
216 N.E.2d 812, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). The "interest and fairness" test that the court
employed in Miller did not, in my view, depend upon the defendant's subsequent
move to New York. See also the discussion in Sedler, The Territorial Imperative:
Automobile Accidents and the Significance of a State Line, 9 Duq. L. REv. 894, 399-407
(1971).
56. See also Farberv. Smolack, 20 N.Y.2d 198, 229 N.E.2d 36,282 N.Y.S.2d 248 (1967),
where it was held that the New York wrongful death statute and the New York rule
of vicarious liability applied in a suit between New York parties arising out of a
fatal accident in North Carolina.
57. In light of Farber,New York could now decide Kilberg v. Northeast Air Lines,
9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 188 (1961), as it did without resorting to
"manipulative techniques." Even assuming a Massachusetts interest in limiting the
liability of th6 airline, New York would certainly apply its own law to insure full
recovery to the beneficiaries of a New York decedent.
58. Chief judge Fuld contended that, "Babcock and its progeny enable us to formulate a set of basic principles that may be profitably utilized, for they have helped us
uncover the underlying values and policies which are operative in this area of law."
81 N.Y.2d at 127, 286 N.E.2d at 457, 885 N.Y.S.2d at 69. I would respectfully submit
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Nor, in stare decisis terms, were they necessary to the decision in
Neumeier. Rather, as the opinion clearly indicates, the court promulgated rules of decision and applied the applicable rule to the
situation presented in that case. It could have decided Neumeier
with reference to the fact-law pattern presented and reached the
result that it did by holding that where the plaintiff is from an immunity state, and defendant is from a recovery state, and the accident
occurs in the plaintiff's state or another immunity state, the plaintiff
should not recover. The court was not merely deciding the case
before it, but was developing rules that would not only cover that
case, but rules that would cover cases it had previously decided and
cases that had not yet arisen. In no sense was it acting in the common
law tradition of judicial method. 59
The court's formulation of choice of law rules in this manner
raises some interesting questions as to what it will do in future cases.
For example, the first "Neumeier rule" states: "When the guestpassenger and the host-driver are domiciled in the same state, and
the car is there registered, the law of that state should control and
determine the standard of care which the host owes to his guest." 60
The court has decided that question in the case of two parties from
a recovery state who are involved in an accident in an immunity state,
as is demonstrated by Tooker. But it has not decided the question
in the reverse situation, that is, when two parties from an immunity
state are involved in an accident in a recovery state such as New
York, and, at least in terms of interest analysis, this is not necessarily
the same case as Tooker. Where both parties are from a recovery
state, there is a false conflict. The parties' home state has an interest
in applying its own law to allow recovery to a resident plaintiff injured elsewhere, since the social and economic consequences of the
accident will be felt in the home state, and the state of injury has
no interest in applying its law to immunize a non-resident defendant
and his insurer.61 When two parties from an immunity state are
involved in an accident in a recovery state, their home state likewise
has an interest in applying its own law to immunize its resident
defendant and his insurer.62 But here, unlike the previous situation,
that the "Neumeier rules" are not necessarily consistent with the policies "uncovered"
in those cases.
59. As to the tendency of courts in conflicts cases to "take refuge" in rules, see the
discussion in Sedler, Babcock v. Jackson in Kentucky, supra note 85, at 53-57.
60. 31 N.Y.2d at 128, 286 N.E2d at 457, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 70.
61. Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d at 577, 249 N.E2d at 398-99, 801 N.Y.S.2d at 525.
62. And, assuming it is not committed to the place of the wrong rule, will do so
if suit is brought there. See, e.g., Fuerste v. Bemis, 156 N.W.2d 881 (Iowa 1968) (guest
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the state of injurys may also have an interest in applying its law
allowing recovery in favor of a non-resident plaintiff. If the suit is
one for personal injuries, it can be argued that if the plaintiff does
not recover he could become a public charge in that state or that
he might be unable to reimburse resident medical creditors for
medical and hospital expenses. 64 It can also be argued, whether the
suit is one for personal injuries or wrongful death, that the state of
injury has a general compensatory interest in providing recovery
for all persons injured there as part of its policy of extending protection to people who are within its borders.6 5 My own view is that
any interest on the part of the state of injury in allowing recovery
in this situation is more theoretical than real.6 6 In this day and age
the injured plaintiff will get back home, 7 and the only state concerned with his welfare is his home state. If that state denies recovery
in order to protect the defendant and his insurer, the state of injury
should defer to that policy. But most courts, when confronted with
this question, have held that their own law allowing recovery should
be applied in favor of a non-resident plaintiff against a non-resident
defendant, notwithstanding that they also apply their own law when
two of their residents are involved in an accident in an immunity
state,6" and this includes lower courts in New York. 69 Under the first
statute); Wartell v. Formusa, 34 IM. 2d 57, 213 NX.2d 544 (1966) (interspousal im-

murity); McSwain v. McSwain, 420 Pa. 86, 215 A.2d 677 (1966) (same). See also DeFoor
v. Lematta, 249 Ore. 116, 437 P.2d 107 (1968), where Oregon applied its rule limiting
recovery for wrongful death in a suit between the beneficiaries of an Oregon decedent
and an Oregon defendant arising out of a fatal accident in a state that did not limit
liability.
63. Where a suit can be brought under the non-resident motorist or non-resident
tortfeasors act.
64. See the discussion in B. Cuima, supra note 1, at 366. If the suit is for wrongful
death, there is, of course, no question of the victim's becoming a public charge, and
the recovery in a wrongful death action will generally be immune from the claims
of creditors.
65. See the discussion in D. CAvEas, THE CHoICE OF LAW PRocEss, 143-45 (1965).
The fact that the plaintiff was injured there is a sufficient interest, apart from considerations of territorialism, to constitutionally justify the application of that state's
law. Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955).
66. See the discussion in Sedler, Characterization,supra note 15, at 63.65; Conflict
of Laws. Round Table Symposium, supra note 36, at 225-227.
67. Unlike the situation perhaps existing at an earlier period with respect to
injured workmen who were temporarily present in the forum, as reflected in Pacific
Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 306 U.S. 493 (1939), and Alaska
PackersAss'n v. IndustrialAccident Commission, 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
68. See Arnett v. Thompson, 433 S.W. 2d 109 (Ky. 1968); Conklin v. Homer, 38 Wis.
,2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968); Gagne v. Berry, 290 A. 2d 624 (N.H. 1972). Cf. Johnson
v. Johnson, 107 N.H. 80, 216 A. 2d 781 (1966).
69. Bray v. Cox, 39 App. Div. 2d 299, 333 N.Y.S.2d 783 (1972); Kell v. Henderson,
47 Misc. 2d 992, 263 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1965), aff'd, 26 App. Div. 2d 595, 270 N.Y.S.2d 552
(1966).
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rule of Neumeier the New York Court of Appeals has presumably
decided this question, which has not yet been presented to it, and
has decided it in a way contrary to the decisions of lower New York
courts, which have dealt with it specifically.
The second rule of Neumeier states that, "When the driver's
conduct occurred in the state of his domicile and that state does not
cast him in liability for that conduct, he should not be held liable
by reason of the fact that liability would be imposed upon him under
the tort law of the state of the victim's domicile."7 0 No case involving
a New York plaintiff and a guest statute state defendant, with the
accident occurring in the defendant's home state, has yet been before
the New York Court of Appeals. 7 1 Such cases have arisen elsewhere
with the suit being brought in the plaintiff's home state.7 2 These
courts have held that where there were substantial contacts with the
forum, e.g., the trip began in the forum and the parties were to return there, the forum would apply its own law to allow recovery
notwithstanding that the accident occurred in the defendant's home
state.78 A contrary result has prevailed when these factual contacts
were missing.7 4 The rule as formulated by the court in Neumeier
covers both the case where there were substantial contacts with the
forum and the case where there were not, neither of which has yet
been presented to the New York Court of Appeals. Moreover, the
result dictated by the rule would seem inconsistent with the result
in Miller v. Miller," since there the accident occurred in the defendant's home state. Although the Neumeier rules are stated to apply
only to guest statute cases, it is difficult to see why the result should
be different where the defense asserted is that of limited liability for
70. 31 N.Y.2d at 128, 286 N.E.2d at 457-58, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 70. Under that rule if
the accident occurred in the plaintiff's home state and its law permits recovery, the
non-resident driver will not "in the absence of special circumstances" be permitted to
claim the defense.
71. In Pryor v. Swarner, 445 F.2d 1272 (2d Cir. 1971), the plaintiff was a resident
of New York, the defendant was a resident of Florida, a guest statute state, and the
accident occurred in Ohio, also a guest statute state. The trip began in Ohio and was
to end in New York. The Second Circuit, applying New York conflicts law, held, on
the basis of Judge Fuld's concurring opinion in Tooker, that New York would allow
the defense.
72. The defendant, who generally wants the plaintiff to recover, will permit himself
to be served in the plaintiff's home state. See the discussion in Sedler, The Territorial
Imperative, supra note 55, at 399-401.
73. See Foster v. Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1972); Schneider v. Nichols, 280 Minn.
139, 158 N.W.2d 254 (1968); Bennett v. Macy, 824 F. Supp. 409 (W.D. Ky. 1971).
74. See Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563, 267 A.2d 854 (1970); Pryor v. Swarner, 445
F.2d 1272 (2d Cir. 1971).
75. 22 N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968).
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wrongful death.7 6 Possibly Miller could be distinguished on the basis
77
of the defendant's post-accident change of residence to New York
but this is a dubious ground of distinction, 78 and to distinguish
Miller on that basis would be to effectively overrule it. In any event,
the second rule of Neumeier not only operates to decide cases that
have not yet arisen, but casts serious doubt on the court's decision
in Miller.
The third rule of Neumeier covers the unprovided for case, and
in view of the result in Neumeier, indicates that the law of the place
of the injury will generally control. This would mean that an Ontario
plaintiff injured in New York by a New York defendant will recover,
but one injured by the same New York defendant in Ontario will
not. If the difference is explained on the basis that New York has an
interest in providing recovery for a non-resident injured there, this
explanation is difficult to reconcile with the first rule of Neumeier, which denies recovery to an Ontario resident injured in New
York by an Ontario defendant. The distinction effected by the third
rule then cannot rationally be explained with reference to any New
York interest. The only explanation must be that the law of the
state of injury should apply simply because the accident occurred
there. This demonstrates a return to the territorialism that presumably was abandoned in Tooker. Indeed, the three rules of Neumeier,
taken together, say that unless the parties are from the same state,
the law of the state of injury ordinarily applies, which is only somewhat less "all-embracing" than the place of the wrong rule that was
79
abandoned in Babcock.
76 Both defenses relate to the plaintiffs ability to recover, and the interests of the
involved states are the same.
77. 22 N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968).
78. It is difficult to believe that the court would have decided the case differently
if the change of residence had not occurred. The change of residence was relied on
only to show that Maine had no present interest in protecting the nominal defendant;
the accident would still be charged to Maine loss experience for insurance purposes.
79. Perhaps this observation is not entirely fair, since many cases will involve parties
from the same state. Nonetheless, the thrust of the "Neumeier rules" looks to the place
where the injury occurred much in the same manner as did the place of the wrong
rule. In Chila v. Owens, 348 F. Supp. 1207 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), the plaintiff was a resident
of New Jersey, which did not have a guest statute, the defendant was a resident of
New York, and the accident occurred in Ohio, a guest statute state. Applying the third
rule of Neumeier, the court held that New York would not recognize the guest statute
defense, since New Jersey had an interest in allowing the plaintiff to recover. It stated:
With the injured plaintiff and the alleged wrongdoers respectively domiciliaries
of New Jersey and New York, which states are not inhospitable to guest
claims, logic and fairness suggest that New York would equate the New Jersey
claimant's position to that of its own domiciliary and apply the first principle
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With its decision in Neumeier the New York Court of Appeals
has moved in the direction of a "rules approach" for the solution
of conflicts problems notwithstanding that the rules may have been
developed at least in part with reference to considerations of policy
and fairness and the interests of the involved states. More significantly, Neumeier indicates that rules for the solution of confficts
problems will be developed independently of the cases that the court
has decided and will be designed to cover cases that have not yet
arisen. Whatever the court is doing, it is not operating in the common law tradition of judicial method, and in my view this is a cause
for great regret.
INTEREST ANALYSIS AND THE UNPROVmED

FoR CASE

It is unfortunate that Neumeier, presenting the unprovided for
case, was the rock on which New York's "stormy affair" with interest
analysis 0 foundered. If the unprovided for case is approached with
reference to the common policies of the involved states, sound solutions readily appear and would have appeared to the court in Neumeier. The fact that neither state has an interest in applying its law
on the issue as to which the laws differ does not mean that the court
cannot identify common policies of both states which will lead to the
solution of the problem. As Currie has observed:81
It may be that the laws of neither state, nor of both states together, purport to dispose of the entire universe of possible
cases. Identical laws do not necessarily mean identical policies, and different laws do not necessarily mean conflicting
policies, when it is remembered that the scope of policy is
limited by the legitimate interests of the respective states.
It should also be noted that the question is one of choice of laws,
not choice of jurisdictions. The issue before the court in Neumeier,
properly speaking, was not whether New York law or Ontario law
"governed," but whether the defense of guest statute immunity
should be allowed. An analysis of the policies and interests of the
articulated by Chief Judge Fuld-that is, the New York "standard of care which
the host owes to his guest." Id. at 1210.
In terms of interest analysis, of course, this case presents a false conflict in the same
manner as in Tooker.
80. See the discussion in Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, supra note 18,
at 318.

81. B. Curam, supra note 1, at 153.
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involved states may reveal, as in Neumeier, that neither state has an
interest in applying its law on the issue of guest-host immunity, but
when the common policies of both states are considered, this will
furnish guidance on the question of whether the defense of guest
statute immunity should be allowed.
Approaching the problem from this perspective, I would submit
that Neumeier is an easy case. All states have a common policy of
compensating automobile accident victims for harm caused by the
negligence of a driver. A number of states, in order to implement
what I have called anti-tort policies, 8 2 such as protecting insurance
companies from collusive suits, put aside this compensatory policy
where the victim was a passenger in the car of the driver. Whether
the purpose of guest statute immunity is to protect the host from
ungrateful guests-which is difficult to believe83-or to protect insurance companies from collusive suits, or simply to remove this
category of cases from the insurer's liability, thereby increasing its
profits and possibly reducing insurance rates, it is clear that the only
state interested in extending such protection is the defendant's home
state, where the vehicle is insured and where the consequences of
imposing liability will be felt. If that state does not have a guest
statute, this means that the only state interested in protecting the
defendant and his insurer does not do so, and the common policy
of both states in allowing accident victims to recover from negligent
drivers should prevail, causing the court to disallow the defense.8 4
I would carry this further and say that generally in an accident case
where the defendant is from a recovery state,s5 he should be held
liable irrespective of where the plaintiff resides or the accident
occurs. This is because all states have a common policy of allowing
compensation to accident victims, and usually in the unprovided
for case, as in Neumeier, the defendant will be asserting a defense
that represents an exception to that common policy.8 6 But even where
82. See the discussion in Sedler, Characterization,supra note 25, at 52-54.

83. The court in Neumeier observed, however, that this may have been the only
purpose that the Ontario legislature intended to accomplish when it enacted the statute.
31 N.Y.2d at 124, 286 N.E2d at 455, 285 N.Y.S.2d at 67. See also the discussion of the
purpose of the Delaware guest statute in Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 569-70, 267 A.2d
at 858 (dissenting opinion). My own view is that we must look to the purposes that
are advanced by a state's law in light of modem conditions, as opposed to what may
have been the original intention of the legislature. The retention of guest statutes
today serves only to benefit insurance companies and not host insureds.
84. See the discussion in Sedler, Babcock v. Jackson in Kentucky, supra note 25, at
115-117.
85. See note 52 supra.
86. This would cover other immunities and matters such as limitations on wrongful
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the issue is one of affirmative tort liability, such as vicarious
responsibility, I would generally hold the defendant liable if he is
liable under the law of his home state, since such liability is consistent with the common policy of both states in providing compen87
sation for accident victims.
It may be asked why the court in Neumeier did not see it this
way. Perhaps it was because in the unprovided for case a court sees
itself faced with the "windfall dilemma,"88 and is reluctant to allow
the plaintiff greater recovery than is permitted under the law of his
home state, particularly when the accident occurred there. In Neumeier, the court emphasized that New York should not ignore "the
public policy of ... Ontario and .. . [protect] the plaintiff guest
domiciled and injured there from legislation obviously addressed,
at the very least, to a resident riding in a vehicle traveling within
its borders."8 9 But by the same token, it may be asked why a defendant who is insured against such liability under the law of his home
state-or more accurately, the insurer who issued the policy covering
his liability-should be able to escape liability simply because the
defendant had the "good fortune" to injure a victim whose home
state was not equally solicitious for his welfare. In Johnson v. Hertz,90
a federal court, sitting as a New York state court in a diversity action,
death recovery. See the discussions in B. CumIE, supra note 1, at 505-520; Sedler,
Conflict of Laws Roundtable: A Symposium, supra note 9, at 1231-32. Professor Weintraub has questioned the existence of a common policy in the wrongful death situation
because of the substantial variations between the states in determining recovery. Id. at
1261. He also makes the point that, assuming a common policy, the decedents home
state has a significant interest in having that common policy applied. Id. at 1260.
87. Where the defendant's home state imposes strict liability based on an act, e.g., the
liability of the tavern keeper for harm caused by an intoxicated patron, I see an admonitory policy reflected in the law, as well as a compensatory one, so that where the
defendant acted in his home state causing injury to a non-resident elsewhere, his home
state has an interest in applying its law against him to implement that admonitory
policy. That case then would present a false conflict rather than the unprovided for
case. Cf. the discussion in B. Cumsu, supra note 1, at 487-90.
I see the same admonitory policy reflected in a rule imposing strict liability upon
the manufacturer of defective products. See the discussion in R. WrcrarAuB, ComummErAY, supranote 9, at 258-59. It could also be argued that the state where the injury
occurs has an interest in applying its more lenient rule in favor of an out-of-state
manufacturer against its resident plaintiff in order to encourage manufacturers to ship
their products there. If this is so, a true conflict is presented. I agree with Professor
Weintraub however, that any such interest on the part of the plaintiff's home state
seems "attenuated." Id. at 258. I would consider this case then to present a false
conflict, and the manufacturer should be held liable.
88. Much like the situation where the plaintiff in a personal injury action is claiming recovery for a loss that has been met by a collateral source. See, e.g., the majority
and dissenting opinions in Coyne v. Campbell, 11 N.Y.2d 372, 183 NXE.2d 891, 230
N.Y.S.2d 1 (1962).
89. 31 N.Y.2d at 126, 286 N.E.2d at 456, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 68.
90. 315 F. Supp. 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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applied the New York rule of vicarious liability against the owner of
a New York insured vehicle,9 1 notwithstanding that neither the plaintiff's home state nor the state of injury would extend such protection,92 observing, incorrectly it turns out in light of Neumeier, that
"The automobile insurance laws of New York have been held by the
courts of that state to express a policy aimed at protecting innocent
victims of New York vehicle registrants, whether injured or harmed
in New York State or elsewhere."93
The results in the unprovided for cases that have arisen do appear
to depend on whether the court stresses the fact that the plaintiff's
home state would not allow him to recover or the fact that the defendant should not be able to avoid a liability imposed upon him by the
law of his home state. In Johnson v. Hertz, for example, the court
emphasized the responsibility of the defendant to comply with the
policies reflected in New York's compulsory insurance law,04 and
noted that neither the plaintiff's home state nor the state where the
injury occurred had any interest in protecting the defendant from
liability. It paid scant attention to the fact that the plaintiff's home
state did not impose liability against this defendant. Likewise, in
Van Dyke v. Bolves9 5 New Jersey applied the New York rule imposing vicarious liability in favor of a New Jersey plaintiff injured there
by a vehicle owned by a New York defendant. The court noted that
the owner "could reasonably have expected that his conduct would
have been controlled by New York law,"0 6 and did not discuss the
position or expectations of the plaintiff. And in Decker v. Fox River
91. The defendant, Hertz Corporation, was incorporated in Delaware, but had
"extensive offices" in New York. Under New York's compulsory insurance law, Hertz,
of course, had to insure its New York based vehicles. In point of fact, Hertz's vehicles
are insured under a master policy issued by a New York insurer. In Pahmer v. Hertz
Corp., 36 App. Div. 2d 252, 319 N.Y.S.2d 949 (1971), the court held that this justified
applying New York's rule of guest-host liability in favor of a New York plaintiff injured

while a passenger in a Hertz-owned vehicle that was registered in California, where
the accident occurred.
92. The plaintiff was a resident of Massachusetts, and the accident occurred in
New Jersey. The vehicle was apparently stolen, and under Massachusetts and New
Jersey law, Hertz would not be liable in that situation. Such liability was imposed
by New York law.
93. 315 F. Supp. at 304. The court relied on the language to that effect in Tooker,
which was repudiated in Neumeier. See note 32 supra.

94. It said that, "New York has an interest in having its law applied on this issue
so that those regulated by its auto insurance policies will be required to fulfill the
ends at which these policies were aimed." 315 F. Supp. at 804-05. This interest, however, is what Currie called an "altruistic interest." B. CutmE, supra note 1, at 489. The
policy represented by the requirement of compulsory insurance is clearly a compensatory
one, and New York has no interest in applying that policy in favor of a non-resident
injured elsewhere.

95. 107 N.J. Super. 338, 258 A.2d 372 (App. Div. 1969).
96. Id. at 345, 258 A.2d at 375.
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Tractor Co., 97 a federal court in Wisconsin applied the Wisconsin

rule of comparative negligence in favor of a Pennsylvania plaintiff
injured in Pennsylvania by a harvester manufactured by the defendant in Wisconsin. The court saw Wisconsin as having a "governmental interest" in applying its law,98 and saw Wisconsin's law as
representing the "better rule."9 9 Again the orientation was toward
holding the defendant to the standard of liability imposed by his
home state and ignoring the lack of protection afforded the plaintiff
by his home state.1 00
On the other hand, in Ryan v. Clark Equipment Co.,101 a California appellate court held that where an Oregon decedent was killed
in Oregon while operating a vehicle manufactured in Michigan by a
Michigan corporation, the Oregon limitation on the amount recoverable for wrongful death was applicable. It noted that Oregon was the
only state that had any real interest in how the decedent's survivors
were to be compensated, and that the defendant's home state had no
interest "in extending to Oregon residents any greater rights than are
afforded by the state of residence."' 02 In the same vein, in Patch v.
97. 324 F. Supp. 1089 (EMD. Wis. 1971).
98. Id. at 1091. Since Wisconsin imposes strict liability for defective products, it

could be argued that the admonitory policy reflected in that law would be advanced by
holding the manufacturer to some liability irrespective of the victim's fault. Professor
Weintraub makes the point that, "[i]n general, when the only two contact states share
identical policies, but one state has an exception to that policy, if the reasons underlying the exception are inapplicable, it is highly likely that at least one of the states
will have a significant interest in having the shared policy applied." Weintraub,
Conflict of Laws Roundtable: A Symposium, supra note 9, at 1260. Decker may be a
good example of this situation.
99. Wisconsin employs Professor Leflar's choice-influencing considerations. See, e.g.,
Heath v. Zellmer, 35 Wis. 2d 578, 151 N.W. 2d 664 (1967).
100. See also Frummer v. Hilton Hotels International, Inc., 60 Misc. 2d 840, 304
N.Y.S2d 335 (Sup. Ct. 1969). There a New York resident was injured while a guest at a
Hilton Hotel in England. New York retains the common law rule of contributory
negligence; England has comparative negligence. The court held that English law
applied on that issue. It could be argued that England had an interest in providing
recovery for a non-resident injured there, and if so, this is not, strictly speaking the
unprovided for case. In my view it is, because I see no real interest on the part of the
state of injury here. In any event, under the third rule of Neumeier, English law
would apply.
101. 268 Cal. App. 2d 679, 74 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1969).
102. Id. at 683, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 331. In Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal.2d 551, 432 P.2d
727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967), the decedent was a resident of Ohio who was in the
process of moving to California, when he was killed in Missouri by a California
defendant. Missouri had a limitation on the amount recoverable for wrongful death;
California and Ohio did not. The court held that interests had to be analyzed at
the time of the accident, so that it was irrelevant that the beneficiaries now lived in
California. However, it saw Missouri as having no interest in limiting recovery, and
since Ohio had an interest in allowing full recovery, a false conflict was presented, and
Ohio law would apply. My approach to Reich would have been simply to hold that
the defense should be disallowed, since California, the only state interested in protect-
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Stanley Works,103 the First Circuit held that where a New Hampshire
decedent was killed in New Hampshire due to the negligence of a
Connecticut defendant, New Hampshire would apply its law limiting
the amount recoverable for wrongful death.10 4 Neumeier represents
the latest word on the subject, and here too it was emphasized that
the plaintiff's home state failed to protect him.
The inconsistent results in these cases and the differing orientation toward the plaintiff in some and the defendant in others could
have been avoided if the courts had approached the problem in terms
of the common policies of the involved states. In all of these cases
the imposition of liability would have furthered the common policy
of compensating accident victims, 105 and would not trench on any
state's interest. The unprovided for case, like the false and true
conflicts, lends itself to rational solution by means of interest analysis
when common policies are considered. A proper consideration of
those policies would have dictated a different result in Neumeier,
and possibly would have persuaded the court majority that it should
not abandon interest analysis in favor of choice of law rules.
ing the defendant, did not do so. If the court had taken that approach in Reich, the
appellate court might have had a different orientation in Ryan.
In Bolgrean v. Stich, - Minn. _ 196 N.W.2d 442 (1972), the defendant was a
resident of Minnesota, a non-guest statute state, and the plaintiff had lived in
Minnesota during most of her life before moving across the river to attend school in
Fargo, North Dakota. Moorhead, Minnesota, where the defendant lived, is across
the river from Fargo, North Dakota, and the defendant telephoned the plaintiff to
ask her for a date. She accepted. He picked her up at her home in Fargo and drove
her to a dance in South Dakota, where the accident occurred. Both North Dakota and
South Dakota had guest statutes. At the time of the suit, she had graduated from
high school and moved back to Moorhead, Minnesota. The Court did not make a
determination as to whether the plaintiff was domiciled in either Minnesota or North
Dakota at the time of the accident, since it concluded that in view of the extensive
factual contacts with Minnesota, it was the "center of gravity", and its law should
apply on the issue of guest-host immunity. It also emphasized that the vehicle was
insured in Minnesota and observed that, "[tihe insurer of a Minnesota vehicle, it must
be assumed, charged rates applicable to Minnesota risks." 196 N.W.2d at 444. In
Allen v. Gannaway, - Minn. ._., 199 N.W.2d 424 (1972), some of the passengers in a
vehicle driven by a Minnesota resident and involved in an accident in Nevada, a
guest statute state, did not have a firm domicile in Minnesota. The Court held that
Minnesota law applied on the issue of host-guest immunity as to all passengers. Again,
all that it was necessary for the Court to say is that the only state interested in protecting the defendent and his insurer did not do so.
103. 448 F. 2d 483 (2d Cir. 1971).
104. The question of what New Hampshire would do arose somewhat indirectly.
The court was applying Connecticut conflicts law, and Connecticut follows the place
of the wrong rule. The plaintiff argued that Connecticut would look to the "whole
law" of New Hampshire, and it was in this context that the court concluded that
New Hampshire would apply its own law on the question if suit were brought there.
Id. at 492.
105. The trend of tort law is also clearly in the direction of favoring compensation.
See the discussion in R. WmEDRAUt, CozirEarrAny, supra note 9, at 203-04.
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THE QUESTION OF DISCRIMINATION

"Was the New York rule really intended to be manna for the
entire world?" Professor Reese's rhetorical question 0 6 was picked
up by the court in Neumeier and resoundingly answered in the negative. But the question can be stated somewhat differently, and
stating it in that way may suggest a very different answer. Suppose
that the victim in Neumeier was a resident of Ohio, a sister state,
rather than Ontario. The Constitution provides that, "[t]he Citizens
of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of
Citizens in the several States."' 07 If a New York victim had been
injured by a New York defendant in Ohio, New York would give
him or his beneficiaries the "manna" represented by its law allowing
an action by a guest passenger against his host. 08 It is not unreasonable to ask whether the constitutional guarantee of privileges and
immunities entitles the Ohio victim or his beneficiaries to claim the
same "manna." The Constitution also provides that, "[n]o State
shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."' 0 9 Assuming that the Ontario plaintiff who sues
in New York, as in Neumeier, is "within its jurisdiction" for equal
protection purposes, 0 may he too be entitled to claim equal
"manna" with the New York victim? The question of discrimination,
particularly if it has constitutional overtones, cannot be fobbed off
so easily.
The court in Neumeier was aware of the possible discrimination
that its decision could produce, although it did not approach the
issue in constitutional terms. It stated:"'
It is quite true that, in applying the Ontario guest statute to
the Ontario-domiciled passenger, we, in a sense, extend a right
less generous than New York extends to a New York passenger
in a New York vehicle with New York insurance. That,
though, is not a consequence of invidious discrimination; it
is, rather, the result of the existence of disparate rules of law
in jurisdictions that have diverse and important connections
with the litigants and the litigated issue.
With all deference to the court, it would seem that it is begging the
106. Reese, supra note 83.
107. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 2.
108. Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.d 519 (1969). See
also note 29 supra.
109. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
110. See the discussion in B. CumE, supra note 1, at 580-36.
111. 31 N.Y.2d at 126, 286 N.E.2d at 456, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 68.
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question completely. The fact that the rules are disparate is irrelevant, since the question is whether New York is required to give the
non-resident plaintiff the benefit of its rule, which by definition is
disparate to the rule of the plaintiff's home state. And the fact that
different jurisdictions have connections with the litigants does not
answer the question of whether, in light of those connections, it is
discriminatory for New York to refuse to give the non-resident plaintiff the benefit of its more favorable rule. We are talking about the
right to have the benefit of New York law, and simply because
the plaintiff is a resident of a state with a different rule and that state
has some connection with the transaction, does not answer the question of whether, notwithstanding, the plaintiff is discriminated
1 12
against if he is denied the benefits of New York law.
Professor Currie saw the privileges and immunities clause and
the equal protection clause as requiring in some circumstances the
application of the forum's law in favor of non-residents, even though
the application of that law would not advance any of the forum's
governmental interests. 118 Neither of these constitutional provisions,
4
however, "is firmly established as a limitation on choice of law,""
and whether the Supreme Court will in fact recognize such limitations is at best questionable. The traditional grounds that have been
relied upon to invalidate a state's choice of law decisions, due process 5 and full faith and credit,116 have in recent years been given
very limited scope by the Supreme Court," 7 and the Court will be
112. Judge Bergan, dissenting in Neumeer, stated:
There is a difference of fundamental character between justifying a departure
from lex loci delictus because the court will not, as a matter of policy, permit a
New York owner of a car licensed and insured in New York to escape liability

that would be imposed on him here, and a departure based on the fact that a
New York resident makes the claim for injury. The first ground of departure is
justifiable as sound policy; the second is justifiable only if one is willing to treat
the rights of a stranger permitted to sue in New York differently from the way
a resident is treated. Neither because of "interest" nor "contact" nor any other
defensible ground is it proper to say in a court of law that the rights of one
man whose suit is accepted shall be adjudged differently on the merits on the
basis of where he happens to live. Id. at 132-33, 286 N.E2.d at 460, 335 N.Y.S.2d
at 74.
113. See generally the discussion in B. CURUE, supra note 1, at 445-48. Professor
Currie's views in this regard were originally set forth in two articles co-authored by
Professor Herma Hill Schreter (now Kay). See Currie and Schreter, Unconstitutional
Discrimination in the Conflict of Laws: Privileges and Immunities, 69 YALE LJ. 1328
(1960); Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Conflict of Laws: Equal Protection,
28 U. Cm. L. REv. 1 (1960).
114. R. CRAMTON and D. CumuE, CONFLucr OF LAws, 428 (1968).

115. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV.
116. U.S. CONSr. art. IV,§ 1.
117. The last time the Supreme Court considered a question of the constitutionality
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understandably relucant to open up new avenues of constitutional
attack. Nonetheless, it may be well to consider the constitutional arguments that Professor Currie has advanced, since even if a discriminatory result is not necessarily unconstitutional, it is something that
a court should strive to avoid.
Let us first consider the question of privileges and immunities,
and assume for these purposes that the victim in Neumeier was an
Ohio resident injured in his home state. While neither New York
or Ohio has an interest in applying its law on the issue of guest-host
immunity, both states do have a common policy of providing compensation to accident victims injured by negligent drivers, and
guest-host immunity is an exception to that common policy. This is
the same situation as that presented in a spinoff of Grant v. McAuliffe, 11 8 used by Professor Currie, that of an Arizona plaintiff
injured by a California tortfeasor in Arizona. 1 9 In speaking of this
120
case from a constitutional perspective Professor Currie stated:
The rule of abatement on death of the tortfeasor can most
intelligibly be interpreted as expressing a policy for the benefit of those interested in the estate of the deceased; the living
are not to be mulcted for the wrongs of the dead. When a
state legislature abrogates that common-law rule, allowing
suit against the personal representative, it adopts instead a
policy for the benefit of the victim, and primarily of those
victims within the sphere of its own governmental concern:
residents of the state, and others injured within the state. Can
it be said that the state retains a general policy of protecting
estates against liability for the wrongs of the deceased, subject
to an exception in favor of local victims? Such a proposition is
implausible. To withhold from citizens of other states, injured
outside the state, the right to sue the personal representative
in local courts, while granting the right to residents similarly
injured, would rather dearly be a denial of the privileges and
immunities of citizenship, and this though the classification
were in terms of residence rather than citizenship. 12 To exof a state court's choice of law decision was in Clay v. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., 877
U.S. 179 (1964). The last time a choice was invalidated was by a 54 decision in Order
of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947). See generally, R. WmNTRAuB, CoMMENAprY,

supra note 9, ch. 9.

118. 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953).
119. B. CuRMu, supra note 1, at 152-56.
120. Id. at 505-06.
121. See Chila v. Owens, 348 F. Supp. 1207 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), supra note 79, where
it was held that a New Jersey plaintiff injured by a New York defendant in Ohio was
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tend the privilege to nonresidents injured outside the state
only if their home states give them similar "protection" would
be "not so much a differential treatment in good faith of
persons differently situated as a mere attempt to preclude recovery by as many foreigners as possible."
The same rationale, in Professor Currie's view, would require a state
having a dram shop act to hold its resident defendant liable for injuries inflicted by an intoxicated patron upon a non-resident plaintiff in the latter's home state, 122 and a state imposing unlimited
liability for wrongful death to apply its law in favor of the beneficiaries of a non-resident decedent killed by a resident defendant
irrespective of where the accident occurred. 23 And of course, under
this analysis, New York would be acting unconstitutionally if it
refused to allow the Ohio guest to recover against the New York
host.
The common policy of the involved states, however, may justify
the forum's denying the benefit of its law to a non-resident whose
home state does not protect him. Professor Currie illustrates this
point by a spinoff of Milliken v. Pratt, 24 in which a married woman
who is a resident of Maine, which does not recognize married women's immunity, contracts with a Massachusetts creditor in Massachusetts, which does recognize such immunity. Here both states
have a common policy of enforcing contracts and Massachusetts' rule
of married women's immunity is an exception to that common policy.
Massachusetts has no interest in extending this immunity to a nonresident, 25 and since the only state interested in extending the immunity, Maine, does not do so, the common policy of both states in
enforcing contracts comes into play. Massachusetts, in fact, has an
interest in denying the defense in order to promote its policy of
insuring the security of transactions entered into in Massachusetts,
120
and this interest does not conflict with any interest of Maine.
The forum also does not discriminate if it denies a non-resident
the benefit of its law in circumstances where his home state has an
entitled to recover against his host notwithstanding the Ohio guest statute. If New

York were to apply the law of the state of injury to deny recovery, it would be
treating a non-resident differently solely because of that fact, since his home state
would allow recovery.
122. B. Cum, supra note 1,at 508. Cf. note 87 supra.
123. B. CuamE, supra note 1, at 520.
124. 125 Mass. 374 (1878).
125. See the discussion in B. Cum, supra note 1, at 90-91.

126. See the discussion id. at 503-05,
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interest in having its law applied against him. Here Professor Currie
127
states:
In pursuit of its altruistic interests, a state must stop short
of trenching upon the interests of other states; therefore, the
Privileges and Immunities Clause does not require a state to
extend the benefits of its law to nonresidents where the state
has no interest in so doing, and where so doing would interfere with the policy of a state having a direct interest in the
matter.
It is one thing for a state to be generous to nonresidents
at the expense of its own residents and enterprises; it is quite
another to be generous to nonresidents at the expense of other
nonresidents, or even of residents, or local enterprises, whose
activities bring them within the protection of another state's
policy.
I would illustrate this point by the example of two residents from
a guest statute state who were involved in an accident in New York.
The state of injury may see itself as having a real interest in applying
As law to allow recovery, and if so, it is not required to defer to the
conflicting interest of the parties' home state. 28 But if it does not
see itself as having such an interest, or if for any reason, if chooses to
apply the law of the parties' home state, as New York apparently
would do,1 29 it is not impermissibly discriminating against the nonresident plaintiff notwithstanding that it would apply New York law
in favor of a New York plaintiff injured in New York by an Ohio
defendant, 30 and would apply New York law in favor of an Ohio
plaintiff injured by a New York defendant in New York.' 31
Where a New York plaintiff is involved, New York obviously has
a real interest in allowing recovery, which conflicts with Ohio's
interest in immunizing its resident defendant and his insurer, and
New York will prefer its own interest. Since it does not see that
interest in the case of the non-resident plaintiff, who will get back
home and whose welfare is the responsibility of his home state, the
cases are distinguishable, and New York is not discriminating when
it defers to the interest of the plaintiff's home state. Where an Ohio
127. Id. at 495.
128. See note 65 supra.
129. Under the first rule of Neumeier.
130. Under the second rule of Neumeier.
131. Under the third rule of Neumeier. Under my view, of course, this would extend
to an Ohio plaintiff injured by a New York defendant in Ohio.
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defendant is involved, unlike the situation where the defendant is
a New York resident, the plaintiff's home state does have an interest in seeing that its law denying recovery is applied, and again
New York is not discriminating when it defers to the interest of the
parties' home state. The privileges and immunities clause, says Currie, only requires the forum to be altruistic; it does not require it
to engage in "officious intermeddling" contrary to the interests of
the parties' home state.13 2
In summary, Currie says that, "when the law of a state provides
benefits for its residents generally, the same benefits should be extended to citizens of other states unless there is some substantial reason,
in addition to the fact that the governmental interests of the state
do not require extension of the benefit to foreigners, for limiting the
benefit to residents."'' No such reason is present in the case of an
Ohio passenger injured by a New York host in Ohio, and in Currie's
view for New York to sustain the guest statute defense in that case
would be violative of the privileges and immunities clause.
In Neumeier, of course, the privileges and immunities clause
would be inapplicable, since the victim was a resident of Ontario.
But Currie contends that the same results required by the privileges
and immunities clause are required by the equal protection clause.
In his view, a party suing in the forum's courts is a "person within
its jurisdiction" for equal protection purposes, 184 and the privileges
and immunities clause and the equal protection clause are coextensive in prohibiting discrimination against non-residents.31
Therefore, he would say that in Neumeier New York was violating
the equal protection clause when it sustained the guest statute defense
asserted by a New York defendant.
As stated previously, it is questionable whether the Supreme
Court will be willing to find limitations on choice of law inherent
in the privileges and immunities and equal protection clauses. Perhaps it may, and certainly these kinds of questions should be raised
by astute counsel. But whether or not discrimination in choice of
law rises to a constitutional dimension, it is certainly a factor that
a court should take into account in arriving at its decision. The
court in Neumeier was aware of the danger of possible discrimination, but it did little more than beg the question. It is in the un132. See the discussion in B. Cuam, supra note 1, at 495-98.
133. Id. at 508.

184. See note 110 supra.
135. See the discussion in B. CutrEm, supra note 1, at 474-75, 531-32, 538.41. He also
uses the Grant v. McAuliffe spinoff to illustrate the point. Id. at 570-72.
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provided for case that the question of discrimination is most clearly
presented, and to approach the choice of law decision in such a case
with a view toward avoiding discrimination may be a very helpful
guide to its solution.
CONCLUSION

Obviously, I view the decision in Neumeier with considerable
displeasure. The New York Court of Appeals had taken the lead in
forging new directions in conflicts law with its decision in Babcock v.
Jackson,136 and its influence in this area is widely felt. In my view,
Neumeier not only represents a retreat from interest analysis, but a
return to choice of law rules, which, however narrow, are not a substitute for careful consideration of conflicts problems on a case by
case basis with reference to considerations of policy and fairness to
the parties. It is regrettable that New York has chosen to follow that
path.
136. 12 N.Y.2d 473. 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743.
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